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Foreword 
 
The background for this report is the pivotal role of climate finance in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations leading up to the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) 21 in Paris autumn 2015. Developed country parties have 
agreed on a target of mobilizing 100 billion USD annually for climate action in developing 
countries from 2020. The need for climate finance for a green and climate-friendly transition at 
a global level, however, is much larger. Part of this finance can be public, but private finance 
also has a key role to play. 
This report has been produced on assignment from the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and 
Environment (KLD) in the period June to November 2015. The aim of the study is to estimate 
climate finance flows from Norway to developing countries in 2014. The emphasis is on private 
flows mobilized by some type of public action, on a background of public climate finance flows. 
The study is one of a number of such national pilot studies in Europe that in part build upon 
and feed into the OECD-hosted Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance, 
which aims at exploring and assessing methods for measuring private climate finance mobilized 
for climate action in developing countries. 
We thank Gard Lindseth, KLD, Raphaël Jachnik, OECD, and our colleague Knut H. Alfsen 
for valuable comments to the report. In addition, we would like to thank all that have provided 
us with information and have taken the time to answer our questions. The responsibility for any 
remaining shortcomings or errors remains with CICERO. 
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Executive summary 
 
The point of departure for this study is the available data in Norway on climate finance for 
developing countries, instead of exploring technical and methodological challenges. The 
bottleneck in tracking mobilized private climate finance is availability and quality of data. The 
main challenge is that Norwegian public institutions sourcing public support for climate finance 
have not yet implemented sufficient systems for measurement, reporting and verification of 
mobilized private climate finance. In addition, climate finance tracking is constrained by 
methodological difficulties and lacking international standard definitions and methods. 
Despite these limitations, we have estimated that Norwegian public climate finance support to 
developing countries via bilateral and multi-bilateral support amounted to 1,019 MUSD in 2014, 
split into bilateral flows at 578 MUSD and multi-bilateral flows at 441 MUSD. The main public 
institutions sourcing this money, ranked according to the size of their money flows, are: Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) - embassies, Norad, MFA, KLD, and Norfund. We examined public 
support for projects summing up to 692 MUSD, which we could link to an estimated 202 
MUSD of mobilized private co-finance.  Based on our analysis, Norfund is the primary 
institution that has mobilized private climate finance. These climate finance flows are likely to 
be low estimates. In addition, Norway provided another 123 MUSD as climate-related core 
support to multilateral organizations. Although a number of uncertainties are attached to the 
data, they cover the largest flows and most available project data. 
One learning from this process, useful for climate finance pilot studies in other countries, is that 
a number of trade-offs must be made. Instead of aiming at a “perfect” standardized and 
complete tracking system, it seems more pertinent to aim for an international tracking standard 
that is simple and transparent, and with built-in flexibility to handle different contexts in terms 
of actors and sources at international and national levels.
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1 Introduction 
The landscape of Norway’s climate finance support to developing countries is complex, as for 
other donor countries. Tracking climate finance is challenging since the actors and sources 
involved have not established suitable procedures for systematically registering climate finance 
and tracking these flows, in part due to a lack of standardized definitions of concepts and 
delimitation of categories of finance. On this background, there is sizeable uncertainty attached 
to the estimated climate finance flows, in terms of incomplete flow estimates, double-counting 
of flows, or inclusion of dubious flows, e.g. flows that are not related to climate mitigation or 
adaptation. Tracking mobilized private climate flows is more challenging than tracking public 
finance since there are issues of identification, attribution and causality involved for all possible 
approaches in making the concept ‘mobilized’ operational. 
In terms of tracking climate finance flows, the main definitional categories are actors and 
sources, intermediaries transmitting climate finance, financial instruments employed, recipients 
of the flows, and the projects invested in. In this study, we focus on tracking climate finance 
flows from actors and sources, and through intermediaries. The mapping of the receiving end 
of the finance and the impact on greenhouse gas emissions and adaptive measures are beyond 
the scope of the study. In a sister project for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
we explore the suitability of various financial instruments to stimulate and de-risk private climate 
finance in developing countries dependent on national conditions (confer Torvanger et al., 
2015). 
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Category Actor 
Public institution Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 Norwegian embassies 
 Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment 
 Norfund 
 Norad 
 GIEK 
 Export Credit Norway 
 NBIM 
NGOs Peace Corps 
Public companies SNPower 
 Agua Imara 
Multilateral (non-exhaustive list1) GEEREF 
 Global Environment Facility 
 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (WB) 
 Clean Energy Financing Partnership Facility (ADB) 
 Global Gas Flaring Partnership (IBRD) 
 Energising Development 
 UN-REDD 
 Green Africa Power (PIDG) 
Table 1. Actors and sources of Norwegian climate finance for developing countries. 
                                                     
 
 
 
1 An actor worth commenting on is Climate Investment Fund (CIF), for which Norway pledged 249 
MUSD as of June 30, 2014 (CIF, 2015). The data we were provided did not specify disbursed amounts 
from Norway to this fund in 2013 or 2014. Though previously disbursed amounts are likely to have been 
used also during 2013 and 2014, we have chosen to only focus on the amounts disbursed in 2014 in order 
to avoid double-counting, in case this study is replicated in subsequent years. 
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Norway’s main actors providing climate-related international public finance are Norfund, 
NORAD, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Norwegian embassies, and the 
Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment (KLD). Funding is either through bilateral 
channels, which may include state companies and NGOs, through multi-bilateral projects, or 
through multilateral channels.2 The main multilateral channels are development banks such as 
the World Bank (WB), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and financial mechanisms such as Global 
Environmental Fund (GEF) and United Nations’ REDD (Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation), in addition to numerous funds that only or in part have 
a climate agenda, such as the Green Climate Fund (confer Table 1). 
  
                                                     
 
 
 
2 Multi-bilateral funding is voluntary contributions to specific purposes via a multilateral agency, 
supplementary to core membership contributions to multilateral agencies. 
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2 Methods and data 
We focus on two types of climate finance: a) public climate finance from Norway for 
investments and projects on the ground, and b) mobilized private climate finance.  
We first identified and selected public finance actors and sources. Second, we identified available 
data for private climate finance, before assessing whether and to what extent these private 
finance flows were mobilized by some type of public action.3 
Figure 1 presents a simplified version of the study. Public and private Norwegian climate finance 
are tracked, and filtered through climate-relevance and relevant timing. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the study tracking Norwegian climate finance for 
developing countries.  
                                                     
 
 
 
3 An analysis of the Norwegian fast-track climate finance contribution can be found in Moe et al. (2013). 
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Tracking private climate finance mobilized for climate action in developing countries raises a 
number of conceptual, definitional and methodological issues, especially related to accounting 
private climate finance mobilized by public action, and tracking of public climate finance 
through multilateral organizations and funds. Comprehensive discussions of these issues can be 
found in Jachnik et al. (2015), Jachnik and Raynaud (2015), Stumhofer et al. (2015), OECD 
(2015a), Brown et al. (2015), European Union DG CLIMA (2015), and Brown et al. (2011). The 
choices made in preparing this study are in part based on outcome from the OECD-hosted 
Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate Finance. Issues of particular relevance for 
our study are discussed in connection with the next sections, explaining how we gathered data 
on public finance, as well as mobilized private climate finance. First, we discuss some common 
issues. Then, remaining issues are discussed in the context of public finance and mobilized 
private finance. 
2.1 Common methodological issues 
2.1.1 Climate related projects 
Only climate-related financial flows are relevant for this study, either investments to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases or investments to improve resilience to climate change impacts 
(adaptation). In some cases this is straightforward, for instance money for renewable energy 
projects and measures to improve energy-efficiency in production or consumption. However, a 
clear delimitation is more challenging in other cases, for instance when investing in agriculture 
and forestry. In line with reporting procedures among Norwegian institutions we rely on the 
so-called Rio markers to indicate climate relevance. 
Most projects we examined are based on data provided by Norad (see section 2.2 for a list of 
actors covered by Norad’s database) and have Rio markers connected to climate change 
mitigation and/or climate change adaptation. We did not make a judgment on whether some of 
these projects should be excluded from the analysis.   
2.1.2 Timing of climate finance flows: committed or disbursed 
A climate-related project typically lasts for some years. First, a project is proposed by a public 
actor. Then if accepted, funds will be committed and the funds disbursed after some time. 
Depending on the type of projects, private climate finance may be mobilized at the same time 
or later, if at all. The issue is how to attribute the financial flows to specific years for multiannual 
projects (for example in the case of loans). In this study, we only use disbursed amounts for 
public finance and data on private co-finance. 
2.1.3 Relevant public instruments and actions 
A number of financial instruments are available for public institutions to support climate finance 
for developing countries. According to Torvanger et al. (2015), the main categories are revenue 
support, credit enhancement, direct investment, and insurance. These instruments can reduce 
the cost or, more importantly, de-risk private investments. The most widely used instruments 
by Norwegian institutions involved in climate finance for developing countries are direct 
investments (grants, concessional loans, direct equity investments, and fund-level equity 
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investments), and credit enhancement (guarantees). Two categories of public support that are 
more challenging to account for and track, in part because they overlap with financial 
instruments, are technical support and policy support (e.g. strengthening financial institutions 
and markets). On this background, we have given lower priority to account for technical and 
policy support, because they will typically only mobilize private finance indirectly. 
2.1.4 Origin of finance 
For most public climate finance flows, the national origin is straightforward. In the case of 
support to multilateral institutions (banks and funds) this issue is often convoluted by a number 
of steps for each climate flow, from the first contribution until the actual investment in a project, 
where different national, partly national, and private actors are involved. In this report, we focus 
on the first contribution (first stage) and flows that are tractable and therefore more or less 
certain. 
2.1.5 Aggregated climate finance flows 
Aggregating climate finance flow data from various sources requires that data are comparable, 
e.g. in terms of definition of climate relevance, timing, delimitation between public and private 
finance, and methods to estimate leveraged (mobilized) private finance. Non-comparable data 
will cause biased estimates and a substantial risk of over-estimation due to double-counting. 
Thus, as far as possible, definitions, reporting and estimation methods must be identical, or at 
least consistent. In this study we have put emphasis on the issue of comparability, but it should 
be noted that limitations to measurement, reporting and verification of climate finance data 
implies that there are remaining uncertainties related to the comparability of data and therefore 
the accuracy of aggregated climate finance flows. 
2.2 Public finance 
Norad provided CICERO with data on 2 457 financial flows on direct public finance spanning 
over the period 2013 and 2014.4 The data includes all projects with a Rio marker on climate 
change mitigation and/or adaptation for the following public finance extending agencies:5 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) - embassies 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) - Oslo 
 Ministry of Climate and Environment (KLD) 
                                                     
 
 
 
4 Shortly before the deadline for submitting this report, CICERO was informed that some changes were 
made to the data as a result of communication with OECD - Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
In practical terms, this means that the number of relevant projects have increased compared to what is 
indicated here. The new projects amount to another 20 MUSD in public finance. 
5 NORAD (2015) and (2014) report on ‘Food security in a climate perspective’ programs, containing 
some adaptation related activities in agriculture.  
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 Norad 
 Norfund 
 Norwegian Peace Corps 
The data includes a large amount of details on each flow, such as the name of the extending 
agency, the program officer, the agreement title, the agreement partner, a description of the 
project, the type of assistance (bilateral or multi-bilateral), the form of assistance (e.g. project-
type interventions), and the amount disbursed in each year both in USD and in NOK. 
Figure 2 illustrates the flows for 2014 based on the database provided by Norad.6 These flows 
are divided between extending agencies and according to the type of assistance. In 2014, these 
six extending agencies disbursed 1,019 MUSD, of which 441 MUSD were multi-bilateral 
transactions. 
 
Figure 2. Norwegian climate-related financial flows to developing countries, 2014. 
                                                     
 
 
 
6 Data for Norfund was adjusted based on information provided directly by Norfund. 
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In addition to the flows described above, Norad provided us with data on core support to 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) and other multilateral organizations. Based on imputed 
shares provided by the OECD, Norad has calculated the climate-relevant part related to core 
support to MDB.7 The data is summarized in Table 2 below. In 2014, a total of 123 MUSD was 
provided to these multilateral institutions.8 
Agreement partner Climate relevant contribution 
to multilateral organizations 
in 2014 (‘000 USD) 
IDA – International Development Association 34 080 
SCF – Strategic Climate Fund 30 150 
AFDF – African Development Fund 28 954 
GEF – Global Environment Facility 9 666 
NDF – Nordic Development Fund 5 643 
GEF – LDCF – Least Developed Countries Trust Fund 3 491 
GEF – SCCD – Special Climate Change Fund 2 380 
UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 
2 072 
ASDF – Asian Development Fund 2 014 
AFDB – African Development Bank 1 684 
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal 
Prot. 
1 325 
IBRD – International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
935 
ASDB – Asian Development Bank 401 
IDB – Inter-American Development Bank 103 
TOTAL 122 898 
Table 2. Norwegian core contributions to multilateral organizations which are climate 
related according to the OECD. 
In this study, the primary focus is on non-core support to MDB since it is easier to follow the 
flows from the source to the recipient.  
The data provided by Norad did not include full information on the monetary contribution of 
other public or private actors to the various flows such as SN Power or the Norwegian Export 
                                                     
 
 
 
7 The numbers are a result of a communication between OECD and Norad in autumn 2015. 
8 The numbers indicated in the table are not final and small changes may therefore occur later. 
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Credit Guarantee Agency (GIEK). In order to identify climate finance from relevant actors, 
CICERO created a list of public actors based on earlier projects (confer Torvanger et al., 2015) 
and existing literature (Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2014). The list was 
circulated to various ministries and completed based on input from the KLD. The following 
public agencies were then added to our list of public actors: 
 Norwegian Export Credit Guarantee Agency (GIEK) 
 Export Credit Norway 
 SN Power 
 Agua Imara 
 Statoil 
 Statkraft 
 Norwegian Central Bank Investment Management (NBIM) 
Statoil, Statkraft, and NBIM have a significant public ownership share, but were excluded from 
the analysis, given that these entities do not operate under a subsidiarity mandate.9 The 
Norwegian Export Credit Guarantee Agency, Export Credit Norway, SN Power and Agua 
Imara have, however, been included in the analysis. SN Power and Agua Imara are included in 
the study since these companies are joint ventures with Norfund. They are partly owned by 
public actors without a subsidiarity mandate such as Statkraft and BKK and only the share 
related to Norfund is included as public capital towards the results. In the case of Statkraft for 
example, its share counts towards mobilized private capital (Norfund, 2014). In addition, only 
projects not previously reported on by Norfund have been included in the analysis in order to 
avoid double-counting. Data on these actors was not directly available and therefore had to be 
collected via a combination of meetings, phone calls, email exchanges and publicly available 
reports. In this process, CICERO identified flows for another 98 MUSD in 2014. 
Data from actors like GIEK is likely to be complete, but it is uncertain to what extent we 
captured all flows from other actors such as Agua Imara and SN Power. 
The additional challenges we encountered in the process of gathering data on public finance are 
described in the following sub-sections. 
                                                     
 
 
 
9 The subsidiarity principle implies a mission to build the private sector and that public money is used to 
‘crowd in’ or mobilize private development finance (Stumhofer et al., 2015). 
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2.2.1 Not all public actors should be included 
Besides obvious public actors such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we included some 
additional public actors (e.g. SN Power and Agua Imara), while we made the decision to leave 
out other public actors (Statoil, Statkraft, and NBIM). The actors included have at least a 50 % 
public ownership and operate under a mandate of subsidiarity.10 Only projects not reported in 
Norad’s database are included in the additional public actors category, and only the share of the 
project that can be linked to Norfund has been accounted for as public finance, the rest being 
accounted for as mobilized private capital.  
2.2.2 Completeness of the data 
The data provided by Norad was assumed to be complete for the extending agencies covered 
by the dataset. Data provided by Norfund indicated that some projects were missing. 
Incompleteness and possible errors in the data will obviously affect results. 
2.2.3 Treatment of guarantees and export credits 
A challenge in estimating mobilized private finance is the treatment of guarantees. In some 
cases, guarantees can directly mobilize private finance. In other cases, guarantees will be part of 
a larger package, for example including equity from a public actor and an interest rate subsidy. 
In such cases, it becomes challenging to determine how much private capital is mobilized by 
the guarantee itself. At present, several methodologies exist to account for guarantees, such as 
the approach developed by OECD Development Assistance Committee (2013).  
In the Norwegian case, guarantees are emitted by the Norwegian Export Credit Guarantee 
Agency (GIEK). GIEK did not emit guarantees to climate related projects in 2014, hence we 
did not need to conclude on the treatment of guarantees. Yet, it will be important to agree on 
how guarantees should be accounted for in future studies. 
Export credits can also be discussed at length. In its annual report, Export Credit Norway 
indicates that 76 % of the projects it provided a loan to would not have been realized (in part 
or in full) without the loan (Export Credit Norway, 2015, p. 21). For this reason, Export Credit 
Norway is a relevant public actor, though only the loans that have mobilized private finance 
should be accounted for.  
                                                     
 
 
 
10 Development Finance Institutions (DFI) operate under a subsidiarity principle (Stumhofer et al., 2015). 
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2.3 Private finance mobilized by public intervention 
In addition to lacking data on some public actors, Norad’s database did not include data on the 
amount of mobilized private climate finance. Identifying these flows turned out to be a time-
consuming task as data is not necessarily available. In addition data may be estimated based on 
different definitions, or may be provided in different currencies or time periods.  
We adopted an approach allowing us to focus on the ‘largest volumes’ first. For the actors’ part 
of Norad’s database, we first sorted out the financial flows based on the extending agency, the 
form of assistance, the type of assistance and the sector. Figure 3 shows a chart with some 
details on the financial transfers from Norad in 2014. The figure can be interpreted as follows: 
Norad disbursed 330 MUSD in 2014 (this number can also be seen in Fig. 2). Of these, 179 
MUSD went to projects/initiatives labelled as ‘project-type interventions’, including 89 MUSD to 
the multilateral agency Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (multi-bilateral transaction), 
where the funds have been used for energy and the environment projects and programs. The 
data further details which projects have been funded. These projects are not shown in Figure 3 
for simplicity purposes. 
 
Figure 3. Climate finance flows from Norad, 2014. 
For each actor, we selected the five largest financial bilateral transfers in 2014 as well as the 
largest transfers to multi-bilateral entities. In addition, we checked the remaining projects and 
hand-picked a couple of projects which seemed promising in terms of how much private climate 
finance had been mobilized. Figure 4 shows how much public finance is covered in this study 
for public agencies that are included in Norad’s database 
  
CICERO Report 2015:04 
Estimating mobilized private climate finance for developing countries - 
A Norwegian pilot study 
14 
  
 
Figure 4. Public climate finance support amounted to 1,019 MUSD in 2014, of which we 
investigated 692 MUSD (68 %) in more detail. 
We did not investigate all projects because obtaining data on mobilized private climate finance 
proved to be a time-consuming task. Still, the projects not investigated involved relatively small 
amounts, or are projects with limited potential for mobilizing private climate finance. Although 
we cannot guarantee that these projects have not mobilized private climate finance, the short-
term private finance amount should be limited. Even though it can be argued that indirect public 
finance (e.g. capacity building such as building institutions and supporting market reforms), will 
contribute to mobilizing private climate finance in the longer term, we did not attempt at 
estimating these amounts. 
In addition, we did not use a significant amount of time on Export Credit Norway. From their 
annual report, we found that approximatively 100 MUSD were provided as loans to renewable 
and climate projects by end of 2014 (Export Credit Norway, 2015). Provided that the maximum 
tenure on a loan is 18 years and that Export Credit Norway provides loan up to 85 % of the 
value of the project, it is unlikely that more than 5-10 MUSD in private climate finance has been 
mobilized in 2014. Because of our choice of focusing on bigger numbers, we moved our 
attention on other actors and projects.    
Once the projects were identified, CICERO combined meetings, phone calls, email exchanges 
and literature reviews (e.g. annual reports) to gather additional data. Eventually we gathered 
funding data from public actors outside Norway, amount of private capital mobilized from 
Norwegian actors, and to some extent, the amount of private capital mobilized from non-
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Norwegian actors. For actors not included in Norad’s database, meetings, phone calls, email 
exchanges and literature review were used to gather relevant data for our analysis.  
The main challenges faced by CICERO in estimating mobilized private capital are detailed 
below. 
 
2.3.1 Estimating mobilized private capital 
An existing agreement on foreign public participation and/or private funding may not always 
be a guarantee that these funds eventually will be transferred to the project. We have not entered 
into details to check whether the committed amount has effectively been disbursed for all 
projects (see section 3.1.1 for a concrete example). 
Estimating mobilized private capital is a complex and challenging undertaking. Jachnik et al. 
(2015) explore a number of issues related to concepts, definitions, type of public interventions, 
value of public interventions, value of total private finance, and estimation of private finance 
mobilization. It is more straightforward to estimate mobilized private capital for some projects 
since data is known and available. For other projects, public finance may only mobilize private 
capital in subsequent years. For some projects which may only mobilize private climate finance 
indirectly, only an estimated leverage factor may be available. In these case, we assumed that no 
private climate finance is mobilized (confer 2.3.3). 
2.3.2 Challenge in accounting for attribution 
Some projects are easier to account for in the sense that a number of investors get together for 
a single purpose, for instance, the construction of a wind farm. Other projects are more 
complex. This happens, for example, when investors invest in a fund where money is reinvested 
in other funds, which in turn invest in projects. Private capital can thus be leveraged at several 
levels. The private capital indicated in our database (spreadsheet) is considered mobilized 
(certain), which implies that we ignore higher level effects (see 3.1.2 for details and concrete 
examples).11 This is in line with the approach used in the recently released OECD (2015a) report 
“Climate Finance in 2013-14 and the USD 100 billion goal”.  
The consequence of this choice is that the estimate shown in the following section must be 
interpreted as a low estimate, since one may expect that at least some projects have mobilized 
private climate finance at higher levels. 
In terms of causality between public action and mobilized private finance, we accepted the data 
on mobilized private finance supplied by relevant funds and companies, confer examples in 3.1. 
We calculated the share of private capital resulting from the Norwegian contributions as 
volume-based pro-rata attribution, in accordance with the approach used in OECD (2015a).  
                                                     
 
 
 
11 The full database (Excel spreadsheet) is available from CICERO upon request. 
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2.3.3 Estimating mobilized private climate finance based on an estimated 
leverage factor 
Norway contributed to a fund denominated ‘Get-Fit’ and to ‘Green Africa Power’, confer Box 
1. These have in common that private climate finance will only be mobilized at a later stage. 
Though an expected leverage factor is available, we did not include any amount in terms of 
mobilized private climate-finance given the uncertainty in the estimate and the difficulty of 
avoiding double-counting. 
Box 1: Get-Fit – estimated leverage factor of 1:5 
Norway contributes to a fund that tops up a feed-in tariff for renewable energy production in 
Uganda, the so-called Global Energy Transfer Feed-in Tariffs. The Norwegian contribution was 
13 MUSD in 2014 and Norway pledged 66.5 % of the total. No private capital was mobilized 
in 2014. However, several private actors are interested in the scheme, including TrønderEnergi 
and Jakobsen Elektro, which may invest in renewable energy projects in Uganda as a result of 
the program. The expected leverage factor is 5 (GET FIT Uganda, 2014).  
Identifying causality is a challenge since it is a combination of the top-up feed-in tariff and of 
the existing feed-in tariff that will eventually mobilize private climate finance. For the Get-Fit 
case Uganda could have been attributed part of this private mobilization. If the renewable 
energy projects in addition are co-financed in the future (partially funded by public agencies 
and/or made possible by public guarantees, etc.), the causality becomes very uncertain. The 
expected leverage factor of 5 should therefore be considered as an upper limit. The real leverage 
factor will be lower since other actors and programs will have contributed to making the 
renewable energy projects financially attractive.  
More research is needed on this particular issue. CICERO has, however, not concluded on how 
indirect mobilization should be treated and has therefore not included an amount of private 
finance mobilized as a result of the GET-FIT in the spreadsheet. Had we done this, the amount 
of private finance mobilized in Norway would have increased by 67 MUSD. In the case of 
‘Green Africa Power’, for which the indicated leverage factor is 2, this leverage factor would 
lead to another 38 MUSD mobilized private capital.  
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3 Analysis of climate finance flows 
In this section we first present concrete cases illustrating some of the issues discussed above 
before providing an estimate of publicly mobilized private capital. 
3.1 Cases and issues 
3.1.1 Accuracy of data – Example 
Norfund is a partner in the development of a 30 MW hydropower project at Fula Rapids, South 
Sudan. The project is supposed to be financed in collaboration with Nord-Trøndelag 
Elektrisitetsverk (NTE) and the government of South Sudan. According to some sources the 
project came to a stop in 2015 and no evidence was found that the partners in the project had 
effectively disbursed the capital.12 In our analysis, we relied on the numbers provided by the 
different actors we talked to, without adjusting the data. 
The database Norad provided us with reports that 811,000 USD was disbursed in 2014. The 
three partners are supposed to contribute equally to the project, meaning that we assumed 
another 811,000 USD from the Government of South Sudan and also from NTE. Using 
volume-based pro-rating, we reported 406,000 USD as mobilized private capital in the 
spreadsheet (leverage factor of 0.5). 
3.1.2 Attribution of finance – Examples 
CICERO has been in touch with the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund 
(GEEREF). The data obtained provided us with a good base to discuss the issue of attribution. 
Note that the data indicated here should not directly be compared to the numbers reported in 
the spreadsheet. In the spreadsheet, we relied on disbursed amounts, whereas the following 
examples are not linked to a specific year. The examples are useful to justify why we only focus 
on amounts that can directly be linked to the disbursed public finance and why we ignore higher-
order effects. The value of this section is to explain how we treated the issue of attribution. The 
data in the spreadsheet builds on the knowledge provided below, but is based on data provided 
by Norad for 2014 and reported in USD. 
                                                     
 
 
 
12 http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/nyheter/2015/fula-falls-stoppet/  
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GEEREF 
GEEREF is a fund-of-fund, which means that capital is invested in funds, which in turn invest 
in projects. There are thus three levels of investments. In level 1, Norway invested 12 million 
Euro into the fund, while the European Commission and Germany invested another 100 million 
Euro.13 Together, they mobilized 110 million Euro from private investors (none from Norway), 
bringing the total to 222 million Euro. The leverage factor is thus:  
110 𝑀𝐸𝑢𝑟
12 𝑀𝐸𝑢𝑟 + 100 𝑀𝐸𝑢𝑟
= 0.98 
The Norwegian share of mobilized private capital can be calculated as: 
12 𝑀𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐,𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦
100 𝑀𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐,𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 + 12 𝑀𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐,𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦
∙ 110 𝑀𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 11.8 𝑀𝐸𝑢𝑟 
At level 2, GEEREF invests in other funds, taking a 10-15 % equity share. This means that 
GEEREF 222 MEUR will mobilize another 1,554 million Euro from development banks and 
private investors if we assume a 12.5 % equity share and no management fee. The total money 
at level 2 then reaches 1,774 million Euro. The level 2 leverage factor is thus 8. 
There are different ways of estimating this leverage factor. For instance, GEEREF would 
assume that it is only the public contribution (112 million Euro) which has mobilized the capital 
at level 2. With this approach, the leverage factor increases to nearly 16. Our approach, however, 
implies that it is the public and private investment in GEEREF which together have contributed 
to mobilizing capital at level 2, hence the lower leverage factor. If we apply this logic to the 
Norwegian public contribution, we can conclude by estimating the level of capital mobilized by 
the Norwegian public contribution at 96 million Euro.14 
In turn, the 1,774 million Euro from level 2 will be invested in projects with debt-to-equity 
ratios of 30/70 or 50/50. Assuming a debt-to-equity ratio of 40/60, another 2,661 million Euro 
will be mobilized in level 3. The leverage factor at level 3 is thus 1.5. This implies that at level 3, 
the initial Norwegian endowment contributes to raising another 48 million Euro, bringing the 
total to 144 million Euro. The leverage factor for Norway is thus 12. These numbers are 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
 
13 European Commission (2013) presents an account of climate funding for developing countries. 
14 (12 million Euro / 222 million Euro) x 1,554 million Euro + 12 million Euro from level 1. 
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Figure 5. Mobilized private climate finance at different levels with GEEREF. 
The GEEREF case indicates that it is possible to estimate how much private capital has been 
mobilized at several levels as long as numbers are available. These numbers are, however, often 
uncertain and investing at higher levels involves increasing number of assumptions and more 
uncertain assumptions, which in turn increase the uncertainty of the estimate.  
In 2014 MFA disbursed 14 000 USD to GEEREF. Since the focus is on amounts that can 
directly be linked to public finance, we attribute the amount of mobilized private capital 
according to a volume-based pro-rating at the first level. The 14 000 USD have therefore 
mobilized slightly below another 14 000 USD in private capital.  
EnDev 
The second example is Energising Development (EnDev). EnDev provided us with the 
following amounts.  
 Public Norway 2013/2014: 9.7 million Euro 
 Public Foreign 2013/2014: 65.2 million Euro 
 Private Foreign 2013/2014: 121 million Euro 
 Other Private Foreign (markets EnDev no longer is involved in), 2013/2014: 9 
million Euro 
 Estimated additional private leverage 2013/2014: 177 million Euro 
 Total leverage: 307 million Euro 
‘Private Foreign’ is an estimate from EnDev, where the number of projects involving 
technologies supported by EnDev (solar home systems, improved cook stoves, etc.) was 
multiplied by the own contribution of the beneficiaries, correcting for missing data and 
underreporting.   
For the sake of our study and in line with recent work (OECD, 2015b), we retain first-order 
level mobilized private capital, which is the 121 million Euro. The amount of capital mobilized 
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based on Norway’s public contribution is thus 15.6 million Euro, which corresponds to a 
leverage factor of: 1.6.15 
EnDev goes further and claims that the initial contribution will lead to results beyond the 
investment period. EnDev thus claims a share of the outcome due to their initial contribution, 
which is calculated based on their initial financial contribution. For 2013/2014, this led to 
another 9 million Euro mobilized.  
Finally, according to EnDev, investments outside EnDev’s monitoring can be traced back to 
their initial financial contribution, such as imitators (copy cats). EnDev’s estimate is 177 million 
Euro mobilized in 2013/2014. In practice, this estimate raises some concerns (EnDev claims it 
is careful and conservative in its estimates). According to EnDev, for instance, the Norwegian 
company Differ built two production sites for improved cook stoves in Senegal and Indonesia. 
Although EnDev has no direct linkages to Differ, EnDev’s direct contribution to the sector 
over the last decade created enthusiasm and awareness about this market. EnDev claims that 
Differ would probably not have set up these production sites without EnDev’s contribution, 
and hence argues that they should be able to count a share of those investments.  
EnDev’s leverage factor is thus: 307 million Euro / (9.7 + 65.2 million Euro) = 4.1. Similarly, 
the share attributable to Norway amounts to 9.7 * 4.1 = 40 million Euro.  
In order to be consistent, we only estimated directly mobilized private capital and have therefore 
not included higher levels. This approach will likely underestimate how much private capital has 
been mobilized, but it will greatly reduce the risk of double-counting. Hence, the 11 MUSD 
Norway disbursed in 2014 have mobilized an estimated 20 MUSD in private climate finance 
(only first-level order effect). 
                                                     
 
 
 
15 121 million Euro / (9.7 million Euro + 65.2 million Euro) x 9.7 million Euro = 15.6 million Euro. 
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3.2 Summary of issues and choices made 
The following Table 3 summarizes the challenges we have encountered while collecting the data. 
The template used is that of the OECD-hosted Research Collaborative’s 4 stage framework and 
overview of decisions points to estimate publicly mobilized private climate finance, as presented 
in Jachnik, Caruso, Srivastava (2015, p.8). 
Stages Short description of methodological options pursued 
1. Define core 
concepts 
Climate change activities: we follow the methodology of the OECD DAC Rio 
markers for climate change mitigation and adaptation 
Public and private finance: we follow the definition of the OECD DAC, which 
considers transactions as public when undertaken by public entities at their own 
risk and responsibility. Other entities/transactions are considered private. 
Country classification: recipient countries are defined as developing based on  
the OECD DAC’s list of ODA-eligible countries 
Geographical origin of private finance: we follow the methodological choices 
of the OECD DAC 
2. Identify 
public 
interventions 
and 
instruments 
Specific instruments: we included all public transactions regardless of the 
instrument used 
3. Value 
public 
interventions 
and account 
for total 
private 
finance 
involved 
Currency and conversion: Volumes of finance are reported in USD. An 
exchange rate of 6.3 NOK per USD was used for 2014. 
Point of measurement: The amounts of public capital from Norway that have 
effectively been disbursed. Private co-finance is added. Mobilized private 
capital are estimated based on the information available and can be effective or 
estimated. 
4. Estimate 
private 
finance 
mobilisation 
Causality and attribution: we assumed that the projects we obtained numbers 
for have been mobilized by public finance. Yet, we only include private numbers 
when these are relatively certain (confer section 3.1) 
Table 3. Issues faced while collecting the data and choices/approaches selected. 
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3.3 Total climate finance  
3.3.1 Selection of projects  
Project description Public support 
(Norway) ‘000 
USD 
Mobilized private 
finance ‘000 USD 
Public finance 
instrument 
used 
‘Get-FiT’ supported by the MFA 13 329 N/A Grant 
‘Lake Turkana Wind Project’ 
supported by Norfund 
10 661 61 833 Equity 
‘Feasibility study Muchinga – 
hydropower’ financed partly by 
Norad 
1 553 973 Grant 
‘Economic Valuation of Changes 
in Amazon Forest Area’ supported 
by Norad via the World Bank 
952 Unlikely Grant 
‘Solar Energy Rwanda’ supported 
by Norfund 
487 3571 Equity and loan 
‘GEEREF’ supported by the MFA 14 14 Equity fund 
Table 4. Selection of six projects included in our study, as well as the financial instruments 
used. 
3.3.2 Key findings  
Figure 6 summarizes our findings. We have been able to track an estimated 202 MUSD in 
mobilized private capital from the 676 MUSD we have investigated from the extending agencies 
covered by Norad’s database. In addition, the 98 MUSD we identified from other public finance 
sources (e.g. SN Power) have mobilized an estimated 147 MUSD in private finance.  
 
Figure 6. Publicly mobilized private climate finance, 2014. 
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Based on these numbers, an estimated average private finance leveraged factor of 0.3 can be 
calculated for 2014 for the following extending agencies: MFA-Oslo, MFA-embassies, KLD, 
Norad, Norfund, and Norwegian Peace Corps. This estimate is based on our conservative 
assumptions in accounting for mobilized private climate finance, for example not taking into 
account indirect mobilization, and only accounting for first-level effects when it is likely that 
these have contributed to mobilizing private climate finance at higher level effects. The 
corresponding leverage factor for projects outside Norad’s database public support (SN Power, 
Agua Imara) amounts to 1.5. 
In addition, as discussed in section 2.2, Norway provided core support to multilateral 
organization, of which a share is climate-related. Some of this support is likely to have mobilized 
private capital. 
3.4 Bilateral and multi-bilateral climate finance 
Figure 7 splits the amount of mobilized private climate finance between bilateral and multi-
bilateral sources. Private finance mobilized by multilateral banks and funds is not part of this 
picture as it was outside the scope of this study.  
 
Figure 7. Allocation of private capital mobilized between bilateral and multi-bilateral 
channels, 2014, based on the projects we examined on details (projects outside Norad’s 
database, namely those pertaining to Agua Imara and SN Power are excluded from the 
figure). Numbers have been rounded. 
Figure 7 indicates that bilateral projects mobilized 178 MUSD in 2014 (leverage factor of 0.6), 
while multi-bilateral projects mobilized 25 MUSD (leverage factor of 0.06). These numbers are 
not directly comparable due to the limitations described earlier. Many of the multi-bilateral 
projects we analyzed pertain to forestry, where it has been difficult to identify whether, and how 
much, private capital has been mobilized. This could explain the relatively low leverage factor 
for multi-bilateral projects.  
Alternative ways of showing the data are possible, including separating between extending 
agencies. Although this could be illustrative by allowing actors to identify how private capital is 
most effectively mobilized, one must note that the data is not accurate. Therefore disaggregating 
results to a more detailed level may lead to misinterpretation. 
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3.5 A focus on a short time-period can misrepresent reality 
Finally, we emphasize our focus on financial flows in 2014, which can introduce a bias, as 2014 
may have been a less representative year for a number of extending agencies. For example, 
Norfund supported climate-related projects for 30 MUSD in 2013 and 102 MUSD in 2014. We 
could link 2013 flows to 59 MUSD in mobilized private capital (leverage factor of 2) and 2014 
flows to 155 MUSD in mobilized private capital (leverage factor of 1.5). The bias created by 
focusing on a short period (one year) can thus potentially be large. We did not make an attempt 
at estimating this possible bias. 
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4 Conclusions 
The bottleneck in tracking Norwegian climate finance for developing countries is availability 
and quality of data. Essentially, public institutions that are sourcing public support for climate 
finance have not yet implemented sufficient systems for measurement, reporting and 
verification of climate finance flows. This data limitation is particularly pressing in the case of 
tracking private climate finance mobilized through public action. In addition, climate finance 
tracking is constrained by methodological difficulties and lacking international standard 
definitions and methods. This means that there exists a significant room for improvements in 
tracking climate finance, both in terms of reliability and completeness, provided that methods 
and standardization are improved, and sufficient procedures for measurements, reporting and 
verification implemented in the public institutions responsible for sourcing and extending 
climate finance for developing countries. 
The point of departure for this study has been available data in Norway on climate finance for 
developing countries, instead of exploring technical and methodological challenges. Tracking of 
bilateral climate finance is generally more straightforward than tracking multi-bilateral climate 
finance, although some multilateral institutions have established procedures and reporting that 
facilitate estimation of mobilized private flows. One learning from this process, potentially 
useful for climate finance pilot studies in other countries, is that a number of trade-offs must 
be made. Different concerns pull in different directions. Instead of aiming at a “perfect” 
standardized and complete tracking system, it seems more pertinent to aim for an international 
tracking standard that is simple and transparent, and with built-in flexibility to handle different 
contexts in terms of actors and sources at international and national levels. This is in line with 
objectives of the ongoing activities to track private climate finance mentioned. 
Norwegian public climate finance support to developing countries amounted to 1,019 MUSD 
in 2014, split into bilateral flows at 578 MUSD and multi-bilateral flows at 441 MUSD. The 
main public institutions sourcing this money, ranked according to size of money flows, are MFA 
- embassies, Norad, MFA, KLD, and Norfund. From these flows, we carried out a more detailed 
analysis of flows amounting to 692 MNOK. From the examined public support at 692 MUSD 
(covered by the Norad database), we have estimated that an additional 202 MUSD of private 
finance was mobilized. Other public support covered is at 98 MUSD, which according to our 
estimates has mobilized 147 MUSD of private climate finance. Based on our analysis, Norfund 
is the primary institution that has mobilized private climate finance.  
These climate finance flows are not complete, but rather low estimates. However, they cover 
the largest flows and most available data. A number of uncertainties are attached to the data and 
estimates. In terms of bilateral and multi-bilateral climate finance flows, tracking the former is 
more straightforward and less prone to errors than the latter. Collecting data has proven to be 
a time-consuming task since the climate finance flows must be tracked at the level of individual 
projects. Improved availability of data, however, will eventually facilitate tracking of climate 
finance flows. Also a number of ongoing activities in MDBs, bilateral Development Finance 
Institutions (DFIs), the OECD-hosted Research Collaborative on Tracking Private Climate 
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Finance, the OECD DAC, country pilots, and the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) under 
the UNFCCC, will improve our prospects of tracking climate finance flows. 
Literature 
Brown, J., M. Stadelmann, L. Boni, R. Jachnik, T. Kato (2015), Estimating mobilized private climate finance for adaptation. 
Climate Policy Initiative and OECD. 
Brown, J., B. Buchner, G. Wagner, K. Sierra (2011), Improving the effectiveness of climate finance: A survey of leveraging 
methodologies, December, ODI, CPI, EDF, Brookings. 
Climate Investment Fund (CIF) (2015). Finances. Retrieved October 27th, 2015 from: 
www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/node/39 
European Union DG CLIMA (2015), Shifting private finance towards climate-friendly investments. “Policy options for 
mobilizing institutional investors’ capital for climate-friendly investment”, Final report, 6 March, 
CLIMA.A.2/ETU/2013/0035. 
European Commission (2013), European Union climate funding for developing countries in 2013. 
Export Credit Norway (2015), Annual report 2014. 
GET FIT Uganda (2014), Annual report 2014. 
Jachnik, R., R. Caruso, A. Srivastava (2015), Estimating mobilised private climate finance – Methodological approaches, 
options and trade-offs, OECD Environment Working Papers No. 83, OECD Publishing. 
Jachnik, R., V. Raynaud (2015), Sector-level approach to estimating mobilised climate finance: The case of renewable energy, 
Working Party on Climate, Investment and Development, OECD, Paris.  
Moe, T., S. Kallbekken, S. Nakhooda, T. Fransen, A. Caravani (2013), The Norwegian fast-track finance contribution, 
Working Paper, August, WRI, ODI, CICERO. 
NORAD (2015), Food security in a climate perspective – Annual Report 2014. 
NORAD (2014), Food security in a climate perspective – Annual Report 2013. 
Norfund (Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries) (2014), 2014 Report on operations, Norfund. 
Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment (KLD) (2014), Norway’s sixth national communication under the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, January. 
OECD (2013), Guarantees for development: option for data collection. DAC Working Party on Development Finance 
Statistics, Paris.  
OECD (2015a), Climate finance in 2013-14 and the USD 100 billion goal, a report by OECD in collaboration with Climate 
Policy Initiative (CPI). 
Online: http://www.oecd.org/environment/resources/OECD-CPI-Climate-Finance-Report.htm 
OECD (2015b), Estimating mobilised private climate finance – Policy perspectives, Research Collaborative Tracking private 
Climate Finance, March, OECD, Paris. 
Stumhofer, T., A. Detken, J. Harnisch, B. Lang (2015), Proposal of a methodology for tracking publicly mobilized private 
climate finance, Materials on Development Financing, No. 9, August, KfW Development Bank. 
Torvanger, A., P. Narbel, K.H. Alfsen, K. Pillay (2015), Instruments to incentivize private climate finance, CICERO Report, 
CICERO. 
  
CICERO Report 2015:04 
Estimating mobilized private climate finance for developing countries - 
A Norwegian pilot study 
27 
Annex 1: Spreadsheet containing 
climate finance data  
The end-goal has been to create a spreadsheet which summarizes the data collected. The 
spreadsheet includes nine columns: 
1. Extending agency/actor: A Norwegian public entity providing funding to a project  
2. Type of assistance: Bilateral or multi-bilateral 
3. Project title 
4. Public Norwegian (‘000 USD): Amount disbursed by the actor/extending agency 
measured in 1000 USD 
5. Public Foreign (‘000 USD): Other public capital disbursed along the Norwegian 
contribution measured in 1000 USD 
6. Private Norway (‘000 USD): Private capital disbursed by private actors headquartered 
in Norway, measured in 1000 USD 
7. Private Foreign (‘000 USD): Private capital disbursed by foreign actors, measured in 
1000 USD 
8. Description of the project: Entails a short description of the project 
9. Our remarks: Encompasses important information to understand the data, such as 
how mobilized private capital has been estimated 
Table A1-1 illustrates the nine columns. 
 
Table A1-1. Design of spreadsheet with climate finance data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extending 
agency/actor
Type of 
assistance
Project title Public Norwegian 
('000 USD)
Public foreign 
('000 USD)
Private Norway 
('000 USD)
Private foreign 
('000 USD)
Desciption of 
the project
Our remarks
Project A
Project B
Project C
Other projects
TOTAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Extending agency A
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